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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminal investigations 
have become an increasingly routine feature on the corporate 
landscape.1  However, as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have ramped up their 
domestic enforcement of the FCPA, there has been a lack of 
transparency and guidance coupled with much after-the-fact 
prosecution of U.S.-based companies.2  Although the DOJ provides 
proactive guidance by issuing advisory opinions to companies at the 
outset of business transactions through its DOJ FCPA Opinion 
Release Procedure,3 this procedure is seldom used by businesses, as it 
is perceived to be costly, cumbersome, potentially invasive, and time-
consuming.4  The DOJ Opinion Procedure allows businesses to 
submit information about their prospective conduct to the DOJ, after 
which the DOJ issues an advisory opinion on whether the party’s 
proposed conduct conforms to anti-bribery enforcement policy.5  If 
the DOJ finds that the requestor’s conduct conforms to the present 
FCPA enforcement policy, there will be a rebuttable presumption that 
the requestor’s conduct is in compliance with the FCPA.6  As FCPA 
enforcement continues to rise, it remains to be seen whether the DOJ 
Opinion Procedure will reach its powerful potential as a proactive 
method of compliance.  Potentially exacerbating the problem is the 
lack of literature specifically addressing strategic uses of the DOJ 
Opinion Procedure for companies contemplating prospective 
transactions or payments that may implicate the FCPA.   
                                                
* J.D. Candidate 2015, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. International 
Affairs and B.A. Philosophy 2010, the George Washington University.  The author 
would like to thank his wife, Courtney, as well as his family and friends for their 
love and support.  The author would also like to thank the Hatton W. Sumners 
Foundation, the Dallas Bar Foundation, and the SMU Law Review Association.  
 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: 
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 
499–500 (2011). 
3 See infra Part V. 
4 See infra Part IV.A. 
5 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014). 
6 See id. § 80.10. 
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Part I of this article provides an overview of current FCPA 
enforcement and trends, along with common challenges that 
businesses face in complying with the FCPA.7  Next, Part II analyzes 
the murky beginnings and increasing clarity of the DOJ Opinion 
Procedure through subsequent congressional amendments and 
through a recent SEC and DOJ informal FCPA publication.8  Parts III 
and IV discuss when and how to use the DOJ Opinion Procedure to a 
business’s advantage and how to avoid common pitfalls.9  Taking 
potential concerns into consideration, a business should ultimately 
use the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure when the business (1) is truly 
uncertain about the lawfulness of prospective activity, (2) believes 
that the information it will provide the DOJ will not be disclosed (or 
will not cause injury if disclosed), and (3) believes that the protection 
afforded will outweigh potential harm to the business if it does not 
disclose its prospective conduct and is later challenged on it.10   
Part V outlines in detail the procedures for successfully 
submitting a DOJ FCPA Opinion Request.11  Finally, Part VI 
evaluates whether the benefits of strategically using the DOJ FCPA 
Opinion Procedure extend to voluntarily disclosing actual or potential 
FCPA violations, concluding that that the empirical evidence does 
not support this view in spite of DOJ rhetoric to the contrary.12  
Although the DOJ Opinion Procedure remains an underutilized, 
extremely valuable tool for advisory opinions, the benefits of the 
procedure do not appear to extend to voluntary disclosures of FCPA 
violations at this time.13   
 
II. THE CURRENT FCPA LANDSCAPE 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act14 was enacted with the 
                                                
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Parts III–IV. 
10 See infra Part IV.B. 
11 See infra Part V. 
12 See infra Part VI. 
13 See infra Part VI. 
14 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), 
(g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2012), amended by Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012), 
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goal of “restor[ing] public confidence in the integrity of the 
marketplace”15 by addressing corruption through anti-bribery and 
record-keeping provisions.16 The impetus for passage of the FCPA 
came from reports of U.S. companies making bribes both 
domestically and abroad.17  An SEC investigation reported to 
Congress in 1976 that more than 400 companies (including more than 
117 respected Fortune 500 companies in a variety of industries) had 
admitted to making illegal or improper payments overseas, estimated 
to exceed $300 million.18 
Today, for many American businesses trying to compete and 
survive by developing international business relationships and 
pursuing transactional opportunities abroad,19 the FCPA is the most 
important U.S. law governing international business.20  Since its 
passage in 1977, the FCPA prohibits U.S. citizens, foreign companies 
listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and entities physically present in the 
U.S. from offering or promising to pay a foreign official “anything of 
                                                
and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012). 
15 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, A Resource Guide to 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Resource 
Guide], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf; see also 
Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice & Office of the Chief Counsel for Int’l 
Commerce, U.S. Dep't of Comm., Lay Person’s Guide to the FCPA (2010), 
available at http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/lay-persons-guide.pdf 
(noting that “[t]he FCPA was intended to have and has had an enormous impact on 
the way American firms do business.”). 
16 Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent 
FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 394-95 
(2011). 
17 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 499–500. 
18 Id. 
19 See Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 
907, 997–98 (2010) (noting that American businesses are looking outside of the 
United States in large part due to “the increase in globalization and the saturation of 
domestic markets, it is no longer just large resource extraction companies that are 
doing business in overseas markets. If the increase in FCPA enforcement over the 
last decade has taught us anything, it is that large and small companies in all 
industries face FCPA risk and exposure.”). 
20 Dieter Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate 
Procedures Defense, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 37, 39 (2013) (citing Koehler, 
supra note 19, at 997). 
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value” to obtain or retain business.21  To further promote anti-bribery, 
the FCPA accounting provisions require domestic and foreign 
companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges to regularly provide 
reports to the SEC, maintain accurate records, and create internal 
compliance controls that accurately reflect payments to foreign 
officials.22  In effect, the FCPA provisions work together, as the 
FCPA bribery provision punishes instances of bribery, while the 
FCPA books and records provision helps detect bribery in the first 
place.23  
For many businesses in the United States that undertake extensive 
promotional activities to market and sell their products 
internationally, such efforts may involve paying the expenses of 
international customers to travel to the company’s facilities for 
product demonstrations, training programs, and conferences.24  
However, if the international customer happens to be a government 
official or an individual affiliated with a foreign government-
controlled enterprise—which often is not readily apparent—the 
company’s payments for the customer’s expenses may be seen as 
bribes in violation of the FCPA.25  The FCPA prohibits giving (or 
even offering) “anything of value” to foreign government officials in 
order to gain the official’s influence in obtaining or retaining 
business or an improper advantage.26  Though the FCPA does not 
define the term “value,” the DOJ has enforced the term broadly to 
include both tangible and intangible benefits.27  Accordingly, paying 
                                                
21 Id. at 39 n.4 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1) 
(2012)). 
22 Id. at 39; James A. Barta & Julia Chapman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 825, 827 (2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)-(b) (2012)). 
23 Juedes, supra note 20, at 39–40. 
24 Richard M. Strassberg & Kyle A. Wombolt, Beware Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Traps, N.Y. L.J. (July 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Attorney%20Articles/
2008/Beware_Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_Act_Traps.pdf.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012)) (emphasis added). 
27 Id. (noting as an example that businesses paying expenses for customers to 
attend product demonstrations “would be construed as providing those customers 
with something of ‘value’ under the Act”); see also Ashby Jones, Highlights from 
the Long-Awaited FCPA Guidance, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:24 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/11/14/highlights-from-the-long-awaited-fcpa-
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expenses for customers to attend product trainings or demonstrations 
would be construed as providing something of “value” under the 
FCPA, and thus, such payments and situations may implicate the 
FCPA.28 
Consequently, companies should proceed with caution and take 
steps to ensure that payments for promotional activities are legitimate 
business expenditures capable of withstanding the scrutiny demanded 
by the FCPA.29  The level of requisite caution and due diligence, 
however, depends in large part on the scope and intensity of current 
DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement. 
 
A. Enforcement of the FCPA 
 
While the DOJ and SEC initiated just two or three FCPA cases 
per year during the FCPA’s first twenty-eight years, and related fines 
seldom exceeded $1 million, times have clearly changed.30  The DOJ 
now considers enforcing the FCPA as “one of its top priorities—
second only to fighting terrorism.”31  The number of cases has 
“skyrocketed” in the current era,32 as the SEC and the DOJ have 
                                                
guidance/ (explaining that the FCPA does not contain a minimum threshold amount 
for corrupt payments or gifts under the FCPA “anything of value” statutory 
language, but that it is unlikely that taxi fare or coffee provisions would ever 
evidence the sufficient corrupt intent to be more than nominal value). 
28 Strassberg & Wombolt, supra note 24.  However, “not all payments to 
foreign officials [or government representatives] are banned by the FCPA.  The 
FCPA includes as an affirmative defense payments that are ‘reasonable and bona 
fide’ expenditures, ‘such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf 
of a foreign official’ as long as the payments are ‘directly related’ to ‘the 
promotion, demonstration or explanation of products or services’ or the ‘execution 
of performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.’”  Id.  
Despite being labeled as an “affirmative defense,” however, the provision merely 
clarifies the type of conduct covered by the FCPA.  Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 495. 
31 Juedes, supra note 20, at 40–41. 
32 Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery 
Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 691–
92 (2009). 
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brought ten times as many cases as in prior years,33 with fines 
increasing dramatically and settlement amounts dwarfing previous 
records.34  The agencies do not appear to have any intent of relenting 
from increased FCPA enforcement, as the SEC created a specialized 
unit in 2010 to be “more proactive” in FCPA enforcement,35 and the 
head of the DOJ’s criminal division has reaffirmed that the agency is 
“in a new era of FCPA enforcement[,] and [it is] here to stay.”36  
Preliminary data suggests that the SEC and the DOJ have continued 
their aggressive cross-border enforcement of the FCPA in 2014.37 
In order to develop new strategies for FCPA compliance, 
enforcement agencies have recently focused on international 
cooperation and incentivizing companies to disclose employee 
violations.38  First, an increase in international cooperation on anti-
                                                
33 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 495–96 (noting that while the SEC and the DOJ 
"typically initiated just two or three cases a year" during the FCPA's first twenty-
eight years of enforcement, since 2007, government agencies have brought ten 
times as many enforcement actions).  In 2010, for example, government agencies 
initiated a whopping 74 enforcement actions; in 2011, there were 48 enforcement 
actions; in 2012, there were 23 enforcement actions; and in 2013, there were 27 
enforcement actions.  2014 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER 
LLP (July 7, 2014), available at  
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Mid-Year-FCPA-
Update.aspx. 
34 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 496 n.22 (“Eight of the ten highest monetary 
penalties in FCPA-related settlements were reached in 2010.”).  In 2012, there were 
a total of twenty-three FCPA enforcement actions.  2012 Year-End FCPA Update, 
GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.p
df.  In 2013, the total number of FCPA enforcement actions was again on the rise, 
with twenty-seven agency actions.  2013 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, 
& CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 6, 2014), available at  
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Year-End-FCPA-
Update.pdf. 
35 Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in 
Enforcement Division (Jan. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm. 
36 Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Speech at 24th National Conference 
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/ 2010/crm-speech-101116.html. 
37 2014 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 33.  
38 Barta & Chapman, supra note 22, at 827–28. 
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bribery enforcement has aided U.S. domestic enforcement efforts.39  
Second, companies are increasingly presented with incentives to 
disclose employee violations to obtain favorable treatment instead of 
facing aggressive prosecution.40  Finally, the SEC and the DOJ 
continue to interpret the FCPA’s jurisdiction broadly to include 
conduct outside of the United States.41 
 
1. International Enforcement Efforts 
 
In addition to having familiarity and awareness of DOJ and SEC 
FCPA enforcement, companies must also focus beyond the American 
regulatory sphere, as “[o]ther countries have joined the United States 
in a push for wider investigations [of,] and larger penalties” for anti-
bribery.42  For example, a landmark U.K. Bribery Act enacted in 
2010 appears to overtake the FCPA as the most wide-ranging and 
aggressive international anti-bribery statute.43  Since its passage, 
“[t]he revolutionary U.K. Bribery Act 2010 is still causing ripples of 
uncertainty in the United Kingdom and global business communities, 
despite the [U.K.]’s efforts to enforce the Act in such a way that 
‘ethical companies have nothing to fear.’”44  Although the few 
                                                
39 Id. at 828. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 827–28. 
42 FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP, 
June 2011, at i, available at 
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/NewsDocuments/Hughes%20Hubbard%20FCPA
%20Anti-Bribery%20Alert%20Spring%202011%20PART1[1].pdf. 
43 Id.; see also FCPA/Anti-Bribery Alert Winter 2013, HUGHES HUBBARD & 
REED LLP, December 2013, at i, available at 
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/PublicationDocuments/FCPA%20Anti-
Bribery%20Alert%20Winter%202013.pdf (noting three years after the introduction 
of the U.K. Bribery Act that “[w]here once enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act 
seemed a paper tiger, we now see active prosecutions”).  The U.K. Bribery Act also 
appears to lack recognized FCPA exceptions such as the “exception for ‘facilitating 
or expediting payments’ made in furtherance of routine governmental action . . . .”  
Id. at 29.  Such payments could subject a business to sanctions under the U.K. 
Bribery Act.  Id. 
44 Id. at 265.  In fact, due to the U.K. Bribery Act’s “sweeping scope,” it has 
not only received criticism from business circles, but the U.K. Ministry of Justice 
also delayed the Act’s implementation until July 1, 2011—seven months after the 
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prosecutions of the U.K. Bribery Act have left the international 
business community with little guidance, Director David Green 
clarified that further prosecutions under the U.K. Bribery Act would 
be forthcoming.45  Furthermore, in addition to the U.K., other 
countries such as Germany, and surprising newcomers including 
Australia and Canada, are now willing to investigate and prosecute 
instances of corruption.46   
 Regarding comparative levels of international anti-bribery 
enforcement, seven countries—the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland—
have been classified as “active” anti-bribery corruption enforcers by 
Transparency International,47 meaning that these countries “were 
among the [eleven] largest exporters in the world, have at least ten 
major cases, initiated at least three major cases in the last three years, 
and concluded at least three major cases with substantial sanctions.”48  
Another nine countries—Argentina, Belgium, Finland, France, Japan, 
South Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden—are classified as 
“moderate” enforcers, meaning that the countries have at least one 
major case along with other active investigations.49  Accordingly, due 
to the global nature of anti-bribery enforcement, while U.S. 
                                                
date initially promised—to allow the business community time to adjust to the new 
compliance policies.  Id. at 267. 
45 Id. 
46 FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, supra note 42, at i, 2 (stating that 
“countries, such as Germany, are more willing than ever to investigate and 
prosecute corruption. . . . [Germany] has over 100 open corruption investigations . . 
. .”); FCPA/Anti-Bribery Winter Alert 2013, supra note 43, at i (noting that “where 
we once wondered if non-U.S. governments would continue to strengthen and 
enforce anti-bribery laws, we see resounding confirmation in the form of 
investigations and enforcement activity from heretofore unseen jurisdictions such 
as Australia and Canada.”). 
47 Transparency International is a non-governmental organization with chapters 
in more than 100 countries whose “[m]ission is to stop corruption and promote 
transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of 
society.”  Mission, Vision, and Values, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Oct. 16, 2011), 
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/ mission_vision_and_values. 
48 FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, supra note 42, at 121. 
49 Id. at 121–22.  Interestingly, Transparency International’s 2010 Progress 
Report identified the primary cause of global FCPA under enforcement as a “lack 
of political will,” which arises in the obstruction of investigations and failure to 
fund and staff enforcement-related efforts.  Id. at 122. 
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businesses are justifiably focused on FCPA enforcement, it is 
becoming increasingly important for companies to not lose sight of 
non-U.S. anti-bribery enforcement systems that their actions may 
implicate. 
 
2. Recent FCPA Enforcement Trends 
 
After a momentary decrease in the number of enforcement 
actions between 2010—which had a record-high number of 
enforcement actions—and 2012, enforcement actions in 2013 
increased by 17%.50  Furthermore, the market rate for resolving an 
FCPA enforcement action for corporations “spiked precipitously in 
2013,” as there was a nearly fourfold increase for the average closing 
price for corporate FCPA resolutions, which includes DOJ and SEC 
fines, penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest.51  In 
addition, two of the nine total corporate FCPA resolutions in 2013 
made the “FCPA Top 10” list for the ten highest FCPA settlements in 
U.S. history.52  While speaking at the 2013 American Conference 
Institute FCPA Conference about FCPA cases on the horizon, the 
DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief stated that he expected more “top 10 quality 
type cases” in 2014.53   
With regard to industries affected by FCPA enforcement actions, 
although the DOJ and the SEC in 2013 brought actions against 
traditionally “high risk” FCPA industries such as oil, petroleum 
services, and medical devices, the agencies also pursued prosecutions 
in industries not normally associated with the FCPA, such as clothing 
and automated teller machine manufacturing.54  Finally, although 
new leadership was put in place at both the DOJ and the SEC early in 
                                                
50 See 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 34 (noting that the total 
enforcement actions in 2012 was twenty-three and total enforcement actions in 
2013 was twenty-seven).  “2013 marked another year of vigorous international 
anti-corruption enforcement” due to (1) “a return to the robust enforcement totals 
of recent years,” (2) “a nearly fourfold increase in the size of the average corporate 
fine,” (3) “increas[ed] aggressive deployment of traditional criminal investigative 
techniques,” and (4) “the expansion of multijurisdictional, cross-border cooperation 
and prosecution . . . .”  Id. at 1. 
51 Id. at 3. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 8. 
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2013, and a few prosecutors have left the FCPA enforcement practice 
for in-house legal departments or private practice, there are 
sufficiently seasoned remaining FCPA prosecutors so as to “not 
expect any break in the drumbeat of further prosecutions.”55  This 
increase in overall enforcement, coupled with increased average 
corporate fines, appears to indicate continued, vigorous FCPA 
enforcement.56 
 
B.  Challenges that Businesses Face when Attempting to Comply 
with the FCPA 
 
The FCPA is one of the most feared statutes for U.S. businesses 
operating overseas.  This is due in large part to perfect FCPA 
compliance being extremely difficult or unlikely due to the statute’s 
expansive language, the absence of available judicial and 
administrative guidance, and the inherent realities involved in 
generating business globally.57  Because the FCPA has been amended 
twice in its history but has not received sustained congressional 
attention nor been the subject of formal rulemaking, along with the 
FCPA being seldom litigated,58 there is little interpretation of the 
Act.59  Consequently, businesses and individuals that intend to 
comply with the FCPA have to do so with scant legislative or judicial 
guidance.   
Both the DOJ and the SEC have taken expansive interpretations 
of the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official.”60  Although the FCPA 
statute defines “[t]he term ‘foreign official’ [as an] officer or 
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or 
                                                
55 Id. at 20. 
56 Id. 
57 Juedes, supra note 20, at 42. 
58 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 562. 
59 Juedes, supra note 20, at 42–45. 
60 Id. at 43–44; see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012); Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (statement of the Hon. Michael 
B. Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The DOJ's and SEC's 
enforcement . . . make clear that they interpret the terms ‘foreign official’ and 
‘instrumentality’ extremely broadly.”). 
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instrumentality thereof . . . ,”61 the meaning of the term 
“instrumentality,” which is not at all clear or intuitive, is not defined 
by the statute.62   
Importantly, the DOJ and the SEC have also failed to provide a 
list of factors for determining whether a party is an instrumentality of 
a foreign government, and neither agency has clarified the term in a 
meaningful way.63  In fact: 
 
the DOJ has [brazenly] admitted that ‘it is entirely 
possible, under certain circumstances and in certain 
countries, that nearly every aspect of the approval, 
manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale and 
marketing of a drug product in a foreign country will 
involve a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the 
FCPA.64   
 
The DOJ has admitted that it does not support a change in the 
definition or its interpretation of “foreign official” or 
“instrumentality” because if companies are “not paying bribes,” they 
should have nothing to fear.65  Such ambiguity of FCPA key terms is 
especially problematic in light of the fact that the broad 
                                                
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
62 Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 781, 820 (2011) (noting that “the confusion surrounding this language 
centers on the ambiguous term ‘instrumentality[,]’ . . . [which] the FCPA does not 
define . . . .”). 
63 Juedes, supra note 20, at 44. 
64 Id. (quoting DOJ's FCPA Team Pressing Forward With Pharma Probes, 
MCGUIRE WOODS LLP (July 20, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-
Resources/Alerts/2010/7/DOJsFCPATeamPressingForwardwithPharmaProbes.asp
x). 
65 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 67 
(2011) (DOJ Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Greg Andres), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.PDF 
(noting that the DOJ “[does not] support a change in the definition of foreign 
official . . . [or instrumentality] because we are fearful . . . [of] a bright line rule 
with respect to who constitutes a foreign official.  [The DOJ believes] if companies 
are not paying bribes, that there is really no fear of prosecution from FCPA 
enforcement.”).  
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“instrumentality” interpretation has periodically been applied to 
payments to foreign officials of companies that have state-owned 
interests.66  Once a company with a state-controlled or state-
influenced interest has been seen by the DOJ and the SEC as an 
instrumentality under the FCPA, all employees or agents of the 
company are considered to be “foreign officials.”67  For example, the 
DOJ and the SEC alleged that American construction company KBR 
made improper payments to “foreign officials” who were employees 
of Nigeria LNG Limited.68  The agencies claimed that these 
employees were “foreign officials” for purposes of the FCPA, despite 
the Nigerian government having only a 49% ownership stake in 
Nigeria LNG Limited, while 51% of the company was owned by a 
consortium of private multinational oil companies, such as Shell, 
Total, and Eni.69  KBR eventually settled with the government, 
without the government ever clarifying its interpretation of “foreign 
official” publicly.70   
The KBR example is illustrative in that even if a company is 
majority-owned by private, non-governmental entities, as long as the 
company has some state-controlled ownership, the SEC and the DOJ 
may consider any of the company’s employees “foreign officials” 
under the FCPA.71  Such a questionable interpretation not only 
prevents businesses from reliably determining which companies are 
sufficiently state-owned to qualify as an instrumentality of foreign 
officials, but it also presents serious difficulties in countries like 
China, where state ownership is prevalent.72  For instance, 
                                                
66 Id. at 44–45. 
67 Id. at 44. 
68  Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of 
Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 412–13 (2010). 
69 Id.; Our Company Shareholders, NIGERIA LNG LIMITED, 
http://www.nlng.com/PageEngine.aspx?&id=43 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).  
70 See SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery, Litigation Release No. 
20897A, 95 SEC Docket 570 (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm. 
71 Koehler, supra note 68, at 413. 
72 See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal 
Reform, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 6 (2010), available at 
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf (noting that the 
FCPA “should take into account the realities that confront businesses that operate 
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pharmaceutical companies operating abroad are increasingly exposed 
to FCPA liability because they often interact with doctors, nurses, 
and hospitals that fall within the “government employee” 
proscription.73 
However, there are faint signs of progress on this front, as 
members of Congress have encouraged the DOJ to articulate and 
clarify “under what circumstances an employee of an instrumentality 
who is not exercising the sovereign authority of the state may be 
considered a ‘foreign official.’”74 
 
III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOJ FCPA OPINION 
PROCEDURE 
 
The FCPA Opinion Procedure has evolved from its roots as an 
informal and discretionary system in the 1980s to a standardized 
process providing parties that seek guidance more assurance, 
responsiveness, and confidentiality than was originally provided to 
them.75  The FCPA Opinion Procedure allows businesses to obtain 
the advisory opinion of the DOJ on whether the business’s 
prospective conduct conforms with, or would violate, the DOJ’s 
present anti-bribery enforcement policy.76  If the DOJ finds that the 
                                                
in countries with endemic corruption . . . or in countries where many companies are 
state-owned (e.g., China) and it therefore may not be immediately apparent whether 
an individual is considered a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the act.”); see 
also Koehler, supra note 68, at 413 (criticizing the DOJ and the SEC’s charging 
documents in such contexts that “contain little more than mere conclusory legal 
statements as to the key ‘foreign official’ element . . . [T]he SEC’s complaint 
against Oscar Meza . . . is silent as to any factual evidence supporting the theory 
that employees of unidentified ‘Chinese state-owned companies’ are ‘foreign 
officials.’”).  
73 Johnathan D. Rockoff & Christopher M. Matthews, Pfizer Settles Federal 
Bribery Investigation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904442469045775751107231
50588. 
74 Letter from Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator (Democrat, Minn.), & Chris 
Coons, U.S. Senator (Democrat, Del.), to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. (Feb. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/wp-
admin/documents-databases/265-2-judiciary_FCPA_02_16_12[1].pdf. 
75 KEVIN T. ABIKOFF, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AVOIDING AND RESPONDING 
TO MISCONDUCT § 18.08 (Law Journal Seminars-Press, 2007 & Supp. 2013). 
76 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014). 
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requestor’s conduct conforms to present FCPA enforcement policy, 
there will be a rebuttable presumption that the requestor’s conduct is 
in compliance with the FCPA.77  Notably, although the DOJ 
specifically denies that its public releases of advisory opinions have 
precedential value, the DOJ has followed a trend of extending to new 
cases an “analytical framework” that it previously applied to a similar 
category of cases or situations.78  This appears to indicate that the 
DOJ’s previous guidance influences its future analyses of similar 
situations or circumstances.79 
 
A. Uncertain Beginnings 
 
The original 1977 version of the FCPA had no mention of an 
advisory opinion procedure or review procedure, and the legislative 
history does not appear to have contemplated such a procedure.80  At 
the direction of President Carter in 1978, the DOJ responded to the 
uncertainty claimed by some sectors of the business community by 
establishing its first attempt at an FCPA review procedure in March 
1980.81  The original version of the review procedure gave the DOJ 
great leeway, as the DOJ was not required to issue a response, had 
the freedom to state, or refuse to state, its enforcement intentions, and 
even had the ability to promise only a “‘reasonable effort’ to respond 
within thirty days.”82  The original rule also failed in stating the exact 
impact of an opinion letter from the DOJ and did not provide much 
confidentiality.83   
Initial fears for businesses contemplating the FCPA review 
procedure included the SEC and the DOJ potentially reaching 
                                                
77 See id. § 80.10.   
78 ABIKOFF, supra note 75, at n.14 (citing, as evidence of trends, DOJ Opinion 
Procedure Releases No. 10-03 and 11-01). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977); H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)).  However, the conferees, in considering the 
FCPA legislation, recognized inherent difficulties with clarity and enforcement.  
H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121, 4126. 
81 ABIKOFF, supra note 75; see 28 C.F.R. § 50 (1980). 
82 ABIKOFF, supra note 75 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.18 (1980)). 
83 Id. 
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different interpretations on the legality of a business’s prospective 
conduct,84 the DOJ’s ability to continually demand additional 
supporting documents,85 and the possibility of the agencies’ opinion 
releases being too narrow to provide adequate assurances against 
prosecution.86 
By 1983, the chilling effect on businesses in response to FCPA 
uncertainties became widely recognized.87  The lack of clarity in the 
FCPA provisions created problematic and unnecessary burdens on 
businesses and individuals required to comply with the law.88 
 
B. Increasing Clarity: The 1988 and 1992 Changes to the FCPA 
Opinion Process and the 2012 Guidance 
 
Amendments to the FCPA in 1988 created a procedure for the 
Attorney General to issue guidelines, while also requiring the DOJ to 
create an updated procedure for providing advisory opinion letters.89  
Legislative history shows that the FCPA Opinion Procedure was 
intended to clarify the DOJ’s enforcement intentions under the FCPA 
with respect to specific business transactions, while maintaining the 
confidentiality of documents that were submitted under this 
                                                
84 Id. (“This fear was initially buttressed by the SEC’s refusal to participate in 
the review process . . . . Nevertheless, the SEC issued a statement that it would not 
commence any enforcement action against a company that received a favorable 
DOJ letter prior to May 31, 1981.  This policy was later extended indefinitely and 
has not been altered since.”); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (1977), as 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109–10 (explaining the carefully 
considered division of enforcement of the FCPA between the SEC and the DOJ). 
85 ABIKOFF, supra note 75.  Unfortunately, this fear has not yet been fully 
abated.  Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 80.7 (2014) (“[T]he [DOJ] may request whatever 
additional information or documents it deems necessary to review the matter.”). 
86 ABIKOFF, supra note 75.  This fear has also not been properly dealt with at 
the time of the current writing, as the DOJ “continues to issue opinion letters that 
tend to be couched in narrow, tentative terms.”  Id. 
87 Id. 
88 S. REP. NO. 98-207, at 4 (Aug. 3, 1983). 
89 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 
102 Stat. 1107, 1417 (1988); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 923 (1988) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1956 (discussing the House of 
Representatives’ bill that would create an opinion procedure allowing for DOJ 
advisory opinions in response to specific firm inquiries concerned about their 
FCPA conduct conformance). 
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procedure.90 
Shortly thereafter in 1992, the DOJ created the current formal 
advisory opinion process, the DOJ Opinion Procedure, through which 
businesses and individuals obtain an advisory opinion of the Attorney 
General on whether their prospective future conduct conforms with 
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.91  In 2012, the DOJ, along with 
the SEC, released a long-awaited Resources Guide to the FCPA, 
which provided a detailed analysis of the FCPA and closely 
examined how both agencies approached enforcement of the FCPA.92  
Currently, all of the DOJ FCPA enforcement actions93 and FCPA 
Opinion Procedure releases94 are available on the DOJ’s website.  In 
an effort to improve transparency, the DOJ FCPA website was 
revamped in 2013 to organize the opinion releases into eighteen 
subject matter areas from “Audit Rights” to the “Written Laws 
Affirmative Defense.”95 
 
IV. WHEN TO USE THE DOJ OPINION PROCEDURE 
 
Before proceeding with the FCPA Opinion Procedure, it is 
important for businesses to consider whether the time and effort 
involved in preparing and submitting a request is worth the expense 
and potentially negative implications of the request.  Notably, “[t]he 
                                                
90 132 CONG. REC. H2977-01 (daily ed. May 20, 1986) (joint statement of Rep. 
John D. Dingell & Rep. Timothy E. Wirth) (discussing the purpose, proposed 
practice, and intentions behind the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure). 
91 ABIKOFF, supra note 75. 
92 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15 (noting that the Guide includes 
“hypotheticals, examples of enforcement actions and matters that the SEC and DOJ 
have declined to pursue, and summaries of applicable case law and DOJ opinion 
releases”); see also Legal Aspects of International Sourcing § 12.19 (2013) 
(providing an overview and discussing the historical context of the Resource 
Guide). 
93 FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) 
(providing a helpful list of FCPA, or FCPA-related, enforcement actions by the 
DOJ that may be arranged alphabetically or chronologically). 
94 Index to Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FRAUD SEC., 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/index/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) 
(providing all relevant DOJ FCPA Opinion Releases divided by topic). 
95 Id.; see 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 34. 
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DOJ has published [opinion] releases on a range of FCPA issues and 
in nearly every instance the DOJ has stated its intention not to bring 
an enforcement action with respect to the proposed conduct based on 
the proactive compliance measures disclosed by the company in 
seeking the opinion.”96  In fact, DOJ attorneys have indicated that 
they look favorably on businesses that engage in the DOJ Opinion 
Procedure, as opinion requests indicate a robust FCPA compliance 
process.97   
However, if a business does not submit an opinion request when 
faced with an uncertain FCPA situation, the DOJ may interpret the 
business’s failure to submit an opinion adversely.  After bringing 
FCPA enforcement actions against companies, the DOJ has claimed 
that if companies were uncertain about FCPA enforcement, they 
should have used their ability to request an opinion pursuant to the 
FCPA Opinion Procedure.98   
The DOJ considers the FCPA Opinion Procedure as “unique 
among the criminal laws,” “soft” precedent, and ultimately as “the 
best procedure” for handling business concerns related to the 
FCPA.99  The DOJ sees the FCPA Opinion Procedure as providing 
                                                
96 Mike Koehler, Revisiting A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance 
Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 648 (2012) (emphasis added) (discussing DOJ 
FCPA Opinion Procedure Release examples). 
97 See, e.g., Alexandra Wrage, Approaching the Sphinx: The DOJ's Opinion 
Release Procedure, TRACEBLOG, (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://traceblog.org/2009/03/02/approaching-the-sphinx-the-dojs-opinion-release-
procedure/.  
98 See Brief for the United States at 60–61 n.15, United States v. Esquenazi, 
752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-15331-C), 2012 WL 3638390, at *44–45 
n.15 (citing DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure as an avenue defendants failed to use 
that would have successfully resolved the alleged ambiguity); Brief for the United 
States at 60 n.20, United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-
20604, 05-20606), 2006 WL 5582336, at *60 (stating that if defendants were 
uncertain about FCPA enforcement against their bribes, they could have requested 
an opinion pursuant to the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure); Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellees and Cross-Appellants at 69–70, Fabri v. United Techs. Int’l, Inc., 387 
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-7090 (L)), 2003 WL 25905485, at *69–70 
(arguing that the defendant failed to pursue a DOJ FCPA opinion to avoid further 
scrutiny from the DOJ into its other criminal conduct). 
99 Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of DOJ Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Greg Andres), 
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concerned companies with “explicit guidance”; for example, when 
companies have questions about who constitutes a public official, 
they may ask and thereby obligate the DOJ to provide an advisory 
opinion on the particular issue.100  While the DOJ recognizes that the 
FCPA Opinion Procedure has been historically underutilized, the 
agency consistently encourages companies to request assistance 
before committing a potential FCPA violation.101  The DOJ sees a 
more robust FCPA Opinion Procedure system as serving both the 
interests of businesses and the DOJ, as well as the SEC’s interest in 
avoiding FCPA violations before they occur.102 
 
A.    Concerns Associated with Opinion Requests 
 
  However, there are several potential concerns—real and 
imagined—that deter businesses from submitting requests for 
advisory opinions.103  First and foremost, potential requestors fear the 
implications of a negative opinion from the DOJ with regard to future 
dealings with the agency.104  For example, a company considering 
                                                
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg66921.pdf (stating that the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure “is unique 
among the criminal laws.  Those opinions are published and available to companies 
to analyze them, to understand where the government is focusing its enforcement, 
and what specifically violates the law.”). 
100 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 68 
(2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-
47_66886.pdf (statement of DOJ Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Greg Andres). 
101 See Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Prepared Remarks at the American Bar Association National Institute on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 7–8 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-
06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf. 
102 See id. 
103 See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2014) 
(documenting one opinion release in 2013, two opinion releases in 2012, one in 
2011, three in 2010, and one in 2009); Juedes, supra note 20, at 51–52 (theorizing 
reasons for the FCPA Opinion Procedure’s disuse). 
104 Michael B. Mukasey & James C. Dunlop, Can Someone Please Turn on the 
Lights? Bringing Transparency to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 13 ENGAGE: 
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whether to submit an opinion request concerning its due diligence 
obligations toward third-parties in a potential acquisition may fear 
being asked by the DOJ to explain and defend its current internal due 
diligence process.105  Companies are also frequently (and reasonably) 
concerned with the DOJ requesting additional information if the 
agency determines that the information submitted is insufficient.106  
Although a company has the option to withdraw its opinion request at 
any time,107 this does not alleviate the concern that withdrawing a 
pending request may pique the curiosity of the DOJ.108   
 Similarly, a requestor may fear what the DOJ’s answer could 
mean in future litigation—especially in light of historic FCPA fines 
and settlements.109  If a proposed transaction is not permitted by the 
DOJ through its advisory opinion, and the requestor moves forward 
in one way or another, such action may be tantamount to an 
admission that the requestor had knowledge that a payment was 
corrupt or improper.110  Accordingly, requestors should evaluate the 
costs, benefits, and risks when filing an opinion request and be 
prepared to refrain from the proposed transaction if it is not 
                                                
J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 49, 52 (2012), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/library/doclib/20120405_MukaseyDunlopEngage13.1.pdf. 
105 Wrage, supra note 97. 
106 Hinchey, supra note 16, at 423; see 28 C.F.R. § 80.7 (2014). 
107 28 C.F.R. § 80.15 (2014). 
108 Wrage, supra note 97; see Juedes, supra note 20, at 51 (“[T]he [DOJ FCPA 
Opinion] process may be seen as mere ‘window dressing’ by firms and actually 
alert law enforcement to potential illegal bribery.”).  
109 See, e.g., Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa Lands 5th on our Top Ten List, THE 
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 10, 2014, 1:08 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-lands-5th-on-our-top-ten-list.html 
(listing the Top Ten FCPA enforcement actions of all time: (1) Siemens, $800 
million in 2008; (2) KBR/Halliburton, $579 million in 2009; (3) BAE, $400 
million in 2010; (4) Total S.A., $398 million in 2013; (5) Alcoa, $384 million in 
2014; (6) Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V./ENI S.p.A, $365 million in 2010; (7) 
Technip S.A., $338 million in 2010; (8) JGC Corporation, $218.8 million in 2011; 
(9) Daimler AG, $185 million in 2010; and (10) Weatherford International, $152.6 
million in 2013). 
110 Carl Pacini et al., Enhanced Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Improving the Ethics of U.S. Business Practices Abroad, in RESEARCH ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN ACCOUNTING 77 (Cynthia Jeffrey 
ed. 2012). 
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sanctioned by the DOJ.111    
Additionally, because the DOJ Opinion Procedure can be 
cumbersome and untimely, many potential businesses do not take 
advantage of the procedure.112  This is often because businesses 
cannot afford the thirty days it may take the DOJ to evaluate a 
transaction or venture, when crucial efforts to negotiate, structure, 
and finalize the transaction may be required.113   
 
B. Proceeding with the DOJ Opinion Procedure in Light of its 
Drawbacks 
 
 Considering these potential concerns, a business should use the 
DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure when the business (1) is truly 
uncertain about the lawfulness of a proposed transaction or 
payments; (2) believes the information it will provide to the DOJ will 
not be disclosed (or will not cause injury if disclosed); and (3) 
believes that the protection afforded to the opinion request outweighs 
potential harm to the requestor if it does not disclose and is later 
challenged.114 
Although the effort involved in obtaining an FCPA Opinion is 
admittedly burdensome,115 the clarity that opinion releases provide 
allows companies to move forward with thorny transactions 
confidently.116  For example, a U.S.-based Fortune 500 company that 
                                                
111 Id. 
112 Mukasey & Dunlop, supra note 104, at 52. 
113 Id. 
114 RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 553 (3d ed. 2013). 
115 Michael J. Gilbert, FCPA ‘Opinion Requests’ Key in Enforcement Barrage, 
238 N.Y. L.J. 114, 115 (June 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/6aa98e29-e940-43ba-85e5-
8cfc138d7cf4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fe85ff4a-c119-4e2d-92d3-
934436201f01/NYLJ_Article_(FCPA)08.pdf (“a requestor (or its counsel) will 
likely be required to review documents, interview key players, perform an 
extensive background check on relevant entities and persons, and familiarize itself 
with applicable local law . . . .”). 
116 Id. (“FCPA issues can be complicated and lead to significant uncertainty.  
Too often companies and their counsel, faced with a potentially problematic 
transaction, take on themselves the unnecessary burden of predicting the 
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was considering whether to acquire a controlling position in a foreign 
company became concerned about buying into a significant FCPA 
problem.117  However, instead of canceling the transaction or moving 
forward with it and assuming implicit risk, the company requested a 
DOJ FCPA Opinion Release.118  The company proceeded with its 
request despite being faced with both complicated facts and the 
foreign government’s strict time deadlines.119   
Seeking an expedited review, the company submitted its request 
on January 2, 2008.120  The DOJ completed its review in a timely 
manner and issued its opinion release, blessing the transaction only 
thirteen days later on January 15th.121  The DOJ’s opinion release in 
this situation presents several lessons for potential requestors: first, 
the timeliness of the DOJ’s response to the requestor appears to 
indicate the agency’s willingness to work with companies that 
approach it prior to a transaction closing; second, the DOJ recognizes 
and approves of a requestor’s “remarkable” due diligence in 
consulting with FCPA enforcement agencies before concluding 
potentially problematic transactions.122 
 Fortunately, the DOJ’s willingness to provide opinion releases on 
expedited schedules appears to be a burgeoning trend.123  Due to the 
nature of business negotiations, companies are not likely to have 
complete information about the structure of a pending transaction 
until right before the transaction closes—which is usually when a 
business is least likely to stop and allow the DOJ to consider an 
opinion request.124  However, relatively recent FCPA opinions have 
been issued in record time and on expedited schedules, with the 
                                                
government’s eventual view of the situation.  Instead, they should consider simply 
asking.”). 
117 Id. at 114. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT REVIEW: OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 08-01 (Jan. 15, 2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0801.pdf). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See Mark Miller, FCPA Opinion Procedure: DOJ’s Speed Improves, NAT’L 
L.J. (Aug. 4, 2008). 
124 Id. (“For a company in a hurry, even 30 days can be too long.”). 
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turnaround time on one request being a remarkable four days.125  For 
example, for Release No. 2008-02,126 the requestor, Halliburton, was 
bidding for a U.K.-based company, but the U.K. takeover rules did 
not allow Halliburton the luxury of conducting FCPA due diligence 
before the transaction’s closing and also limited the information 
Halliburton could obtain prior to closing.127  Although the rapidly 
approaching bidding deadlines meant the DOJ had only a few days to 
issue its opinion, the DOJ was able to mobilize its attorneys, obtain 
its necessary agency approvals, and issue the release in time without 
holding up the transaction.128  The story of the Halliburton opinion 
release exemplifies the FCPA Opinion Procedure at its best—when 
the DOJ was able to issue its opinion on a timetable consistent with 
the “get-it-done-yesterday needs of a significant international 
transaction.”129  
 Finally, in deciding whether to make an FCPA Opinion Request, 
companies should note that in nearly every one of DOJ’s published 
FCPA releases, on a divergent range of issues, the DOJ has decided 
not to bring an enforcement action against the proposed conduct 
based in large part on the requestor’s proactive measures in seeking 
the DOJ’s opinion.130  In numerous instances, the DOJ has 
                                                
125 Id. 
126 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW: 
OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 08-02 (June 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf. 
127 Miller, supra note 123. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See, i.e., Koehler, supra note 96, at 648 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW: OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 
09-01 (Aug. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf) (noting that in 
Opinion Procedure Release 09-01, the DOJ stated its intention not to take 
enforcement action with respect to requestor’s proposal to provide sample medical 
devices to a foreign government for a total of $1.9 million for all units, in part 
because the requestor stated that it did not believe the senior official suggesting the 
donation would personally benefit); Koehler, supra note 96, at 648–49 (citing U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW: OPINION 
PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 07-01 (July 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007 /0701.pdf) (noting that in 
Opinion Procedure Release 07-01, the DOJ stated that it did not intend to take 
enforcement action against a requestor who proposed to cover domestic expenses 
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recognized a requestor’s good-faith efforts to comply with the FCPA 
by proactive compliance measures such as the DOJ FCPA Opinion 
Procedure.131  
 
V. PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING DOJ FCPA OPINION RELEASES 
 
A. Informal Discussions Prior to Formal Requests 
 
 Because the opinion procedure process can be lengthy and costly 
for requestors who are unprepared, the process should not be 
undertaken lightly.132  DOJ officials recommend prospective 
requestors meet with them informally, prior to making a formal 
request, to prevent an onerous process.133  Such informal meetings 
can be helpful to determine whether an opinion request should be 
pursued, and if so, may aid in narrowing potential issues and 
identifying information that will be required by the DOJ for the 
opinion.134 
 
B. Content Requirements for FCPA Opinion Requests 
 
 Requests must be in writing and include all relevant and material 
information that bears on the conduct for which an FCPA Opinion is 
requested, as well as the circumstances of the prospective conduct.135  
This includes “background information, complete copies of all 
operative documents, and detailed statements of [any and] all 
collateral or oral understandings.”136  The request must concern non-
                                                
for an Asian country’s delegation trip to the United States because the purpose of 
the trip was to familiarize the delegates with the requestor’s operations and because 
the requestor represented that it would not host entertainment for the officials nor 
provide them with spending money or stipends).  
131 Koehler, supra note 96, at 649. 
132 STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 27 (2d ed. 2010). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.6 (2014). 
136 See id. § 80.6. 
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hypothetical, specified, and prospective conduct.137  Having an 
executed contract is not a prerequisite, “and, in most . . . instances, an 
opinion request should be made before the requestor commits to 
proceed[ing] with a transaction.”138  A number of FCPA Opinion 
Request forms and templates are available electronically and in 
print.139   
 Before making the request, the company or individual requestor 
should ensure that they are either an issuer or a domestic concern, as 
only those categories of parties may receive an opinion.140  However, 
if there is more than one issuer or domestic concern involved in the 
transaction, the requestor should consider making a joint request for 
an opinion, as opinions apply only to the parties that request them.141 
 The requesting party has an affirmative obligation to make full 
and true disclosures with respect to its prospective conduct.142  Each 
request must be signed by an appropriate senior officer (1) “with 
operational responsibility for the conduct that is the subject of the 
request” and (2) who has been designated by the requestor’s CEO to 
sign the opinion request.143  In certain cases, the DOJ may require the 
CEO to sign the opinion request.144   
                                                
137  28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014).  Although the subject of the request need not 
involve “only prospective conduct,” a request is not considered by the DOJ “unless 
that portion of the transaction for which an opinion is sought involves only 
prospective conduct.”  28 C.F.R. § 80.3 (2014). 
138 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 86. 
139 See SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES APPENDIX, 82F (A.A. Sommer, Jr., ed., 
1997 & Supp. 2013) (providing a form outline of a company’s request to the DOJ 
for an FCPA Opinion in the context of a proposed joint venture; it is available 
online through Lexis or in print through Matthew Bender publications).  Id. at 82D 
(providing a form for two entities engaging in a joint venture to make 
representations and warranties with regard to FCPA compliance and specifically to 
FCPA Opinion Requests as a possible prerequisite for either party in assigning its 
rights to a third party). 
140 FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to U.S. persons and businesses 
(“domestic concerns”), and the FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to public 
companies that are either listed on stock exchanges or are required to file periodic 
SEC reports (“issuers”).  RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 2, 86. 
141 Id. at 86. 
142 Id. at 87. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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 If the requestor’s submission lacks any required information, “the 
[DOJ] may request whatever additional information or documents it 
deems necessary to review the matter.”145  However, the DOJ is 
required to make any additional information requests within thirty 
days.146  Following a DOJ additional information request, the 
requestor must provide the information to the DOJ promptly, as a 
request “will not be deemed complete until the [DOJ] receives such 
additional information.”147  The additional information may be 
provided orally, promptly confirmed in writing, and signed and 
certified by the same individual who signed the initial request.148 
 
C. Submission and Delivery 
 
A request for a DOJ FCPA Opinion is required to be in writing 
and should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Criminal Division.149  There should be an original and five 
copies of the request.150  
 
D. DOJ Actions in Response to an FCPA Opinion Request 
 
 Within thirty days after receiving a request in accordance with the 
above procedure, the Attorney General (or his designee) must 
respond to the request by issuing an opinion that notes whether the 
prospective conduct violates the applicable FCPA provisions151 for 
purposes of the DOJ’s present enforcement policy.152  The DOJ may 
                                                
145 28 C.F.R. § 80.7 (2014). 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 28 C.F.R. § 80.2 (2014) (The request should be addressed as follows: 
Attention: FCPA Opinion Group, P.O. Box 28188, Central Station, Washington, 
D.C. 20038.  The address for hand delivery is Room 2424, Bond Building, 1400 
New York Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20005.). 
150 Id. 
151 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (2012). 
152 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2014); see also 28 C.F.R. § 80.13 (2014) (“An FCPA 
Opinion will state only the Attorney General’s opinion as to whether the 
prospective conduct would violate the Department’s present enforcement policy 
under 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2.”). 
    
310 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
not, however, orally provide clearance, release, or other statements 
purporting to limit its enforcement discretion.153  Notably, the DOJ 
has reserved the right to take other positions or actions, as it 
considers appropriate.154 
 
E. FCPA Opinion Release’s Effect on Requestors 
 
An FCPA Opinion applies only to the party requesting it and has 
no application to parties that do not join the request for the 
opinion.155  FCPA Opinion request submissions and FCPA Opinion 
releases do not alter the responsibility of a requestor to comply with 
the FCPA’s recordkeeping provision156 and accounting 
requirements.157  If the Attorney General issues an opinion that the 
requestor’s conduct conforms to the DOJ’s present FCPA 
enforcement policy, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the 
requestor’s conduct is in compliance with the FCPA against any 
action brought against the requestor.158   
However, an FCPA Opinion does not bind or obligate agencies 
other than the DOJ, nor does it affect the requestor’s obligations to 
other agencies.159  Though the SEC does not have an equivalent 
procedure, it has taken the position that it will not take civil 
enforcement action under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
                                                
153 28 C.F.R.§ 80.9 (2014); see also DEMING, supra note 132, at 26 (“Reliance 
can be placed only on a written opinion and not on oral statements by Justice 
Department officials.”). 
154 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2014). 
155 28 C.F.R. § 80.5 (2014). 
156 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)–78m(b)(3) (2012). 
157 Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 80.12 (2014). 
158 28 C.F.R. § 80.10 (2014).  However, this presumption can be rebutted by a 
preponderance of evidence; in evaluating the presumption, a court weighs all 
relevant factors, “including but not limited to whether information submitted to the 
Attorney General was accurate and complete and whether the activity was within 
the scope of the conduct specified in any request received by the Attorney 
General.”  Id.  
159 28 C.F.R. § 80.11 (2014); see 28 C.F.R. § 80.13 (2014) (“If the conduct for 
which an FCPA Opinion is requested is subject to approval by any other agency, 
such FCPA Opinion shall in no way be taken to indicate the Department of 
Justice’s views on the legal or factual issues that may be raised before that agency, 
or in an appeal from the agency’s decision.”).  
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against a party that has obtained a favorable DOJ opinion.160  
However, a favorable opinion does not preclude action by the SEC or 
the DOJ relative to the FCPA accounting and record-keeping 
provisions (or to any other statutory or regulatory provisions).161    
 
F. Public Disclosure of Requestor’s Opinion Request 
 
 FCPA Opinion requests are exempt from disclosure under 5 
U.S.C. section 552 and are not made publicly available, except with 
the consent of the requestor.162  However, this does not limit the 
DOJ, at its discretion, from issuing a release “describing” the 
requestor’s identity, the foreign country’s identity where the 
proposed conduct may take place, and the DOJ’s proposed action in 
response to the FCPA Opinion request.163  The DOJ maintains that 
such public releases do not disclose identifying information.164   
A requestor is permitted to ask the DOJ to not disclose the 
requestor’s “proprietary information” in the DOJ’s release.165  
However, the language of the regulation does not appear to require 
the DOJ to comply with such requests.166 
 
G. Withdrawing FCPA Opinion Requests or Submitting 
Additional Requests 
 
A requestor has the option of withdrawing the FCPA request 
prior to the Attorney General’s response to such a request.167  In the 
case of withdrawal, “[t]he [DOJ] reserves the right to retain any 
FCPA Opinion request[s], documents and information submitted” for 
the request in order to use them for “any governmental purposes” 
                                                
160 DEMING, supra note 132, at 26 (citing Statement of Commission Policy 
Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act 
Release No. 181255, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26, 629 (Nov. 12, 1981)). 
161 Id. 
162 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 80.14 (2014). 
163 28 C.F.R. § 80.14 (2014). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. § 80.14(b). 
166 See id. § 80.14. 
167 28 C.F.R. § 80.15 (2014). 
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subject to some restrictions.168 
If, after receiving a DOJ opinion, a requestor is concerned about 
prospective conduct beyond the scope of the conduct specified in 
prior requests, the requestor may submit additional FCPA Opinion 
requests using the same opinion request procedure.169 
 
VI. DO THE BENEFITS OF THE DOJ FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE 
EXTEND TO INSTANCES OF VOLUNTEER FCPA DISCLOSURES? 
 
While the DOJ appears to positively receive FCPA Opinion 
requests as reflections of a company’s robust FCPA compliance 
policy, does the same attitude extend to voluntary admissions of 
FCPA violations?  While voluntary disclosures of potential FCPA 
violations may appear, at face value, to potentially mitigate penalties 
for corporate FCPA noncompliance, the truth seems to be less clear-
cut based on empirical evidence.   
Voluntary disclosure occurs when a business approaches 
enforcement officials about potential FCPA violations prior to, and 
independent of, an investigation.170  The DOJ, through memoranda171 
and speeches,172 consistently expresses its position that voluntary 
                                                
168 Id. (“subject to the restrictions on disclosures in § 80.14”). 
169 28 C.F.R. § 80.16 (2014); see RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 87. 
170 Hinchey, supra note 16, at 396. 
171 See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (July 5, 
2007) (noting that "prosecutors may consider a corporation's timely and voluntary 
disclosure in evaluating the adequacy of the corporation's compliance program and 
its management's commitment to the compliance program."). 
172 See Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Address at the 2010 Compliance Week Conference (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2010/dag-speech-100525.html (noting that 
cooperation is evaluated “during the prosecutorial decision-making process”); 
Lanny Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared 
Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 3 (Nov. 
17, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-
17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf (noting voluntary disclosures that “we certainly 
encourage and will appropriately reward”); Alice Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the American Bar Association National 
Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 6 (Oct. 16, 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-
06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf (“[I]f you are doing the things you should be doing—
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disclosures are considered by the DOJ, factored into DOJ 
enforcement, and may mitigate potential corporate noncompliance 
penalties.173 
Regarding the specific benefits of disclosure, however, the DOJ 
is consistently vague as to what, if any, benefits are actually 
conferred to disclosing corporations.174  Recent increased 
enforcement and record-breaking FCPA settlements have led many to 
question whether there exists any tangible benefit for voluntarily 
disclosing potential FCPA violations.175   
Such criticism began to mount after the In re Schnitzer Steel 
Industries, Inc. settlement, in which Schnitzer Steel voluntarily 
disclosed bribes that a subsidiary had made to Chinese officials in 
order to gain a competitive advantage.176  Despite Schnitzer Steel’s 
“exceptional cooperation”177 with the DOJ, the company still faced 
approximately $15 million in fines from the DOJ and the SEC for the 
$1.9 million paid in bribes by their subsidiary.178  The Schnitzer Steel 
case has been repeatedly cited by critics of voluntary disclosure, 
arguing that the disproportionate fine levied against the company 
indicates recent FCPA enforcement trends do not reflect the promises 
                                                
whether it is self-policing, self-reporting, conducting proactive risk assessments, 
improving your controls and procedures . . . you will get a benefit . . . . [Voluntary 
disclosure] may not mean that you or your client will get a complete pass, but you 
will get a real, tangible benefit.”). 
173 Hinchey, supra note 16, at 397. 
174 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 172, at 6 (qualifying the benefits of voluntary 
disclosure by stating that “it would not make sense for law enforcement to make 
one-size-fits-all promises about the benefits of voluntary disclosure before getting 
all of the facts.”). 
175 Hinchey, supra note 16, at 397. 
176 In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., 89 S.E.C. Docket 302, 2006 WL 2987067, 
at *2–5; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Senior Officer of Schnitzer 
Steel Industries Inc. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribes (June 29, 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07_crm_474.html. 
177 Fisher, supra note 172, at 5. 
178 Jessica Tillipman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Fundamentals, BRIEFING 
PAPERS (THOMSON WEST), No. 08-10 (Sept. 2008), at 14–15, 
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1038&context=faculty_publications (noting that Schnitzer Steel was fined $7.5 
million in criminal penalties and $7.7 million in disgorgement); see In re Schnitzer 
Steel, 2006 WL 2987067, at *7; Press Release, supra note 176. 
    
314 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
of enforcement leniency for self-reporting and cooperation.179 
 Confusingly, however, the DOJ has highlighted Schnitzer Steel 
as “an excellent example of how voluntary disclosure followed by 
extraordinary cooperation with the Department results in a real, 
tangible benefit to the company.”180  Specifically, the DOJ cites 
Schnitzer Steel’s model cooperation as “critical” to its ability to 
obtain a deferred prosecution agreement and result in a DOJ 
recommendation that the company’s subsidiary pay “a criminal fine 
well below what it would otherwise have received.”181  However, the 
DOJ’s position regarding the benefits of Schnitzer Steel’s voluntary 
disclosure appears misguided and has been heavily criticized in light 
of comparable fines or less severe fines that the DOJ has since issued 
to companies found liable for FCPA violations without voluntary 
disclosures.182 
How then to proceed, with specific and consistent declarations 
from the DOJ vaguely singing the benefits of voluntary disclosure on 
one hand, and skeptical authors and commentators citing the unclear, 
allegedly nonexistent benefits of disclosure on the other?  After an 
ambitious attempt to empirically determine if a pattern exists 
between the levels of bribes paid and the amount of fines levied due 
to those bribes in cases of voluntary and non-voluntary disclosures 
                                                
179 See Hinchey, supra note 16, at 398; Tillipman, supra note 178, at 14 
(“Although the Government claims it will reward companies that self-report 
improper activity, a review of recent enforcement actions demonstrates that the 
SEC and the DOJ are still likely to impose harsh penalties on companies that 
voluntarily disclose FCPA violations.”); see also Michael Freedman, Trust Us, 
FORBES, (Dec. 9, 2006), 
http://members.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1225/132.html?token=MTggT2N0IDIwM
DcgMTU6MzE6MzggKzAwMDA%253D (noting that the benefit to Schnitzer 
Steel from its voluntary disclosure is “hard to discern”). 
180 Fisher, supra note 172, at 5. 
181 Id. 
182 See, e.g., Tillipman, supra note 178, at 15 (noting that: “after Schnitzer 
Steel voluntarily disclosed a $1.9 million improper payment, the Government fined 
the company $7.5 million in criminal penalties and $7.7 million in disgorgement.  
In contrast, after the Government learned of Statoil ASA’s $5.2 million in improper 
payments . . . the U.S. Government fined the company $10.5 million in criminal 
penalties and $10.5 million in disgorgement . . . A comparison of these two actions 
does not adequately demonstrate the benefit Schnitzer received from its voluntary 
disclosure.”). 
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from 2002 to 2009,183 the author of the survey found that the data 
indicates that “companies seem to face a penalty one and a half times 
larger if they voluntarily disclose FCPA violations as compared to 
companies that do not [voluntary disclose].”184 
Hence, a very real possibility exists that a voluntarily-disclosing 
company may face an FCPA penalty commensurate with, or even 
higher than, a penalty levied upon a non-disclosing company’s 
identical conduct.  Voluntary disclosure also forecloses the 
possibility that the FCPA violations may not have been discovered in 
the first place, had the company proceeded to immediately rectify the 
situation without voluntarily disclosing.185  If the survey results and 
academic criticisms are true, the current FCPA voluntary disclosure 
system is undoubtedly problematic, as such inconsistent and random 
penalties for responsible actors appear to remove incentives for 
voluntary disclosure.186  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
As international anti-bribery and FCPA enforcement remains on 
the rise, with increasingly aggressive enforcement and record-
breaking settlements and fines, the contours of the FCPA and what 
exactly qualifies as a bribe to “foreign officials” remain unclear.  In 
light of this persistent uncertainty, the DOJ Opinion Procedure 
remains an underutilized, useful tool for businesses that are: (1) 
legitimately uncertain about the lawfulness of a proposed transaction 
or of proposed payments, (2) believe the information they will 
provide in the request will not be disclosed (or will not cause injury if 
disclosed), and (3) believe that the protection afforded to the request 
                                                
183 See Hinchey, supra note 16, at 399–408 (discussing the survey’s 
methodology and means of analysis). 
184 Id. at 406. 
185 See id. at 418. 
186 See id.; see also Freedman, supra note 179.  (“Cases . . . are prompting 
corporate defense lawyers to question the strategy of voluntary confessions . . . . 
[C]ompanies are finding that by turning themselves in they are opening themselves 
up to years of negative publicity, fines, criminal investigations, indictments and 
highly intrusive compliance monitors . . . . ‘When you look at the [voluntary 
disclosure] cases, they’re really all over the map.  In some cases there appears to be 
credit and in some cases not.’”). 
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outweighs potential harm to the requestor if it does not disclose and 
is later challenged.   
However, the benefits, guidance, and good favor the DOJ 
promises to companies that request a DOJ advisory opinion should 
not be assumed to exist when contemplating voluntary disclosure of 
FCPA violations.  Evidence suggests that the DOJ rhetoric 
concerning the benefits of voluntary disclosure may not be in line 
with actual practice.  Accordingly, a business considering FCPA 
compliance and guidance in the current climate of FCPA 
enforcement is well-advised to proceed cautiously with voluntary 
disclosures but to proceed significantly more comfortably with DOJ 
Opinion Procedure requests. 
